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They were only playing ping-pong

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There is a song in “Oh, what a lovely war!” (the popular musical satire on the First World War) entitled ‘They were only playing leapfrog’. It occurred to me that a modern equivalent would be ‘They were only playing ping-pong’ (as one Lord’s amendment after another amendment was scrapped by the Commons and sent right back). Well, it doesn’t quite scan, but you get the general drift.

After the Commons discussed the Lords’ amendments to the Deregulation Bill on 10 March, the Bill has gone back to the House of Lords, and the rejected amendments are due to be re-considered by them next week, on Monday (16th March). If the Lords follow their usual practice, the ‘offending’ amendments will then be withdrawn and the Bill will finally be passed by the House of Lords, and will then go for Royal Assent.

So the Bill could finally become the Deregulation Act 2015 next week. This leaves precious little time to lay the relevant statutory instrument to amend the Greater London (General Powers) Act 1973, but other statutory instruments are continuing to come forward, so perhaps my supposition that a certain amount of time would have to be allowed before the dissolution of parliament was incorrect. But can the government go on laying this subordinate legislation before parliament right up to the last minute?

Dissolution is due on 30th March, but there is a rumour that Tory MPs have been told to empty their desks and their lockers in time for prorogation on or about the 25th. By my calculation, this will leave barely a week in which to lay the requisite statutory instrument, if that is indeed procedurally possible. Will they make it in time? This is getting to be like one of those old films, with a final car chase (accompanied by loud and urgent music and much squealing of tyres) leading to the denouement right at the very end.

I am glad that I am not a property owner in Greater London, wanting to make my property available for short-term lets. They must be biting their nails by now.

© MARTIN H GOODALL

Further protection for pubs (1)

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Ministers stated their intention on 26 January this year to strengthen the protection of pubs identified as assets of community value, by bringing forward “at the earliest opportunity” amendments to the Second Schedule to the General Permitted Development Order so that in England the listing of a pub as an asset of community value would trigger a removal of the permitted development rights, under Part 3 for change of use, and under Part 31 for demolition, of those pubs that have been designated as ACVs.

The promised changes to the GPDO have now been made, by an amendment order laid before parliament last week. With effect from 6 April 2015, there is a restriction on the changes of use permitted by Part 3, Classes A, AA and C, in respect of a building used within Class A4 (drinking establishments), where that building has been either nominated or designated as an “asset of community value”. Furthermore, even where the developer is not aware of the building having been either nominated or designated as an asset of community value, the permitted development under Class 3 is subject to the prior condition mentioned below.

A public house (as well as other land and buildings) may be designated by the LPA as an asset of community value, on the application of the parish council or a recognised community interest group under Part 5, Chapter 3 of the Localism Act 2011, as supplemented by the Assets of Community Value (England) Regulations 2012 (SI 2012 No.2421) (which came into effect on 21 September 2012). Public houses seem to be the type of property most commonly designated under the Act, representing slightly more than one-third of designated ACVs, with a very high proportion of nominations (not far short of 90%) having led successfully to the designation of pubs as assets of community value.

The primary effect of an ACV designation is a moratorium on the disposal of the property. However, in addition, there is now a restriction on the changes of use that are permitted by Part 3, Class A (change of use to a use within Use Class A1 – shop or other retail use), Class AA (change of use to a use within Use Class A3 – for the sale of food and drink for consumption on the premises, i.e. a restaurant or café) and Class C (change of use to a use within Use Class A2 – financial or professional services).

The restriction applies where the building is used for a purpose falling within Class A4 (drinking establishments) and either it has been designated as an ACV, or the LPA has notified the developer that it has been nominated as an ACV (i.e. proposed for designation as such) under section 89(2) of the Localism Act 2011.

In the case of a building which is already a designated ACV, the restriction lasts for the period of 5 years beginning with the date on which the building was entered on the list of assets of community value. The restriction no longer applies where the building has been removed from that list under regulation 2(c) of the Assets of Community Value (England) Regulations 2012 following a successful appeal against listing, or because the local authority no longer considers the land to be land of community value, or where the building has been removed from that list under section 92(4)(a) of the Localism Act 2011 following the local authority’s decision on a review that the land concerned should not have been included in the local authority’s list of assets of community value. In those cases, the restriction applies during the period from the date on which the building was entered on the list of assets of community value to the date on which it was removed from that list.

In the case of a building that has been nominated as an ACV, but which has not yet been designated as such, the restriction lasts from the date on which the LPA notifies the developer of the nomination, to the date on which the building is entered on the list of assets of community value, or a list of land nominated by unsuccessful community nominations under section 93 of the Localism Act 2011. It follows that if the nomination results in the designation of the building as an ACV, the 5-year restriction mentioned above will then apply immediately, so that the restriction on the change of use will continue without a break, subject only to its possible termination by the removal of the building from the list of ACVs in the meantime.

In the case of a building which is not an asset of community value but which is used for a purpose falling within Class A4 (drinking establishments) it is a condition that, before beginning the development, the developer must send a written request to the LPA as to whether the building has been nominated for designation as an ACV. This request must include the address of the building, the developer’s contact address and the developer’s email address if the developer is content to receive communications electronically.

If the building is nominated for designation, whether before or after the date of the developer’s request, the LPA must notify the developer as soon as is reasonably practicable after it is aware of the nomination, and upon that notification development is not permitted for the specified period mentioned above. Development under Classes A, AA or C must not begin before the expiry of a period of 56 days following the date of the developer’s request as to whether the building has been nominated for designation as an ACV and must be completed within a period of 1 year of the date of that request.

I will deal with the changes to temporary uses under Part 4 and demolition under Part 31 in a later post.

© MARTIN H GOODALL

Shroud adverts on large buildings

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I was pleased to see a report of a planning appeal decision earlier this month in London , in which an Inspector had allowed an appeal against the refusal of advertisement control consent for the display of a large shroud advert on the scaffolding around a building awaiting or undergoing refurbishment.

The Inspector very sensibly decided that an advertisement display of this type would be preferable to ‘drab’ sheeting round the building, and that the shroud advert would ‘enliven the street scene’. This seems to have overridden arguments by the LPA that the advert would be a prominent feature close to a conservation area (although not actually in it).

The essential point is that this display will be purely temporary, while the works on the building are being carried out, a fact which many LPAs seem entirely to overlook. Clearly, the inspector was satisfied that any alleged detriment to amenity would be outweighed by the advantage of the ugly plastic sheeting that normally covers such developments being hidden by a lively and attractive advert.

I very much hope that other inspectors will follow this lead, although it would be unnecessary for these matters to be disputed in this way if the Control of Advertisements Regulations were amended to allow temporary shroud advertising of this type where a building is covered in scaffolding and plastic sheeting during building works.

© MARTIN H GOODALL

Short-term lets in Greater London – still no change

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Royal Assent to the Deregulation Bill, together with a number of other Bills, was signified yesterday at the very last minute before parliament was prorogued. It has now therefore become the Deregulation Act 2015.

Contrary to original expectations (and the original drafting of the Bill), sections 44 and 45, amending section 25 of Greater London Council (General Powers) Act 1973 have not come into force on the passing of the Act, but must await a Commencement Order.

The Deregulation Act 2015 (Consequential Amendments) Order 2015 (SI 2015 No. 971), which was made and laid before parliament today (and I confess that I was unaware that this could be done after parliament had been prorogued) does not bring these two sections into force.

Parliament has been prorogued until Monday 30 March, which is the day on which it is due to be dissolved in any event, so I would be rather surprised if any further statutory instruments could be made and laid before parliament on Monday – but I am rapidly learning that the Whitehall sausage machine never stops churning out subordinate legislation, so we shall have to see what (if anything) emerges on Monday.

If, however, I am right in my long-held belief that the proposed amendment to the 1973 Act, which currently restricts short-term lettings in Greater London, could not be achieved before the General Election, then we shall have to wait and see what the ministers who are in office after 7 May will do about it (if anything). If no commencement order is ever made, this would certainly not be the first legislative provision that has languished on the statute book unimplemented.

© MARTIN H GOODALL

General Permitted Development Order – All change!

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It seems I only have to be away from my desk for a couple of days, and all sorts of major changes take place! De-CLoG has finally succeeded in getting its act together, and has completely replaced the much-amended 1995 GPDO with a consolidated order – the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) Order 2015 (SI 2015 No. 596).

Not only does this consolidate the many amendments that had previously been made to the GPDO, but it also introduces the further amendments, or at least some of them, that the government had been promising or threatening for the best part of a year now. The Order was made on 18 March, laid before parliament on 24 March and comes into force on 15 April. (Talk about ‘last-minute merchants’!).

The main changes made by the new GPDO are:

— the date for the expiry of permitted development right for larger home extensions (in Class A of Part 1) has been extended and will now expire on 30 May 2019;

BUT the time limit for the residential conversion of offices (formerly Class J, now Class O) has not been extended, and is still set to expire on 30 May 2016.

— the previous time-limit for extensions to non-domestic premises (offices, shops, industrial buildings and schools etc) have been made permanent (now Part 7 of Schedule 2);

— a number of new permitted development rights have been inserted in Part 3 (changes of use): the conversion of retail premises to restaurants / cafes (Class C); the existing permitted development to convert a shop to a deposit-taker is replaced by a wider right to convert a shop (or a betting office) to a premises providing financial and professional services (Classes D and F); the conversion of retail premises to assembly and leisure (Class J); the conversion of casinos or amusement arcades to dwellinghouses (Class N); and the conversion of premises used from storage or distribution centre uses to dwellinghouses (Class P);

— a new permitted development right for temporary use of building and land for commercial film-making has been inserted in Part 4;

— a new permitted development right has been included for the provision of click and collection facilities within the curtilage of a shop and for increasing the size of loading bays for shops and permitted development for the extension etc of buildings used for waste facilities (see Classes C, D and L of Part 7 of Schedule 2); and

— a new permitted development right for the installation of solar PV panels, with a generating capacity of up to 1 MW on the roofs of non-domestic buildings (Class J(c) of Part 14).

We are clearly going to have to get out heads round various re-numberings, and more subtle changes to the legislation that this new Order brings about, but it does represent a welcome tidying up of what had become a very messy document. Having been out of the office since Tuesday afternoon, I have only had time to give the new GPDO a very cursory examination, and will have to study it in detail in the coming days and weeks.

I was very close to completing a book on Permitted Changes of Use, and now I am going to have to do some fairly urgent revision of the text! The book won’t need a compete re-write, but clearly a lot of the references to the legislation are going to have to be changed. I had already anticipated these changes to some extent while writing the book, but there are nevertheless going to have to be a number of revisions to the text, and this is an extra task which I would frankly have preferred to avoid. Such is the lot of an author!

© MARTIN H GOODALL

Development Management Procedure Order replaced

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Oh, and just in case you hadn’t noticed, the DMPO has also been replaced by a consolidated Order - the Town and Country Planning (Development Management Procedure) (England) Order 2015 (SI 2015 No. 595). This was also made on 18 March, laid before parliament on 24 March and comes into force on 15 April. (It’s like that old joke about London buses – you wait for ages and then..............)

It contains several drafting amendments, and a handful of procedural changes. No time to say more at the moment.

© MARTIN H GOODALL

And yet more amendments to subordinate legislation

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And did I mention these other statutory instruments? They were all made on the same date and come into force at the same time as the others - the Town and Country Planning (Use Classes)(Amendment)(England) Order 2015 (SI 2015 No.597), the Town and Country Planning (Compensation)(England) Regulations 2015 (SI 2015 No.598), the Town and Country Planning (Section 62A applications)(Procedure and Consequential Amendments)(Amendment) (England) Order 2015 (SI 2015 No.797), and the Town and Country Planning General (Amendment)(England) Regulations 2015 (SI 2015 No.807).

I am not a conspiracy theorist, but it is rather suspicious that after ministers had made such a fuss about these various proposed changes, they delayed actually laying them before parliament until the very last week of the parliamentary session, when MPs were distracted by thoughts of the coming end of this parliament, not to mention events elsewhere that rather distracted attention from what was or was not going on in the Westminster village.

Incidentally, the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (Amendment) (England) Order 2015 (SI 2015 No. 659) must be one of the shortest-lived statutory instruments on record, having already been repealed by the Town and Country Planning (General Permitted Development) (England) Order 2015 (SI 2015 No. 596). [Note that the number of the repealed SI is higher than the number of the SI that repeals it – rather odd that, don’t you think?]

© MARTIN H GOODALL

More on short lets in Greater London

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I am grateful to Sheridan Westlake (who until the end of last week was a Special Adviser - a ‘SPAD’ - at De-CLoG, before going off to work for the Tory re-election campaign) for drawing my attention to the Deregulation Act 2015 (Commencement No. 1 and Transitional and Saving Provisions) Order 2015 (2015 No. 994 (C. 69)), which was made on 27 March, but has not yet been laid before parliament. This will have to await the summoning of a new parliament on 18 May.

Article 6 provides that the date appointed for the coming into force of sections 44 and 45 of the Act (dealing with the relaxation of restrictions on short-term use of London accommodation) is 26 May 2015. Some of the other provisions of the Act are due to come into force in April, but I confess that I am puzzled as to the legality of this, in the absence of this statutory instrument having been laid before parliament. At the head of the SI one usually expects to see three dates – the date the SI was made, the date it was laid before parliament and, finally, the date when the SI takes effect. Only the date on which the SI was made is shown, and so I am left in doubt as to whether this Commencement Order will in fact be effective until after the next session of parliament commences.

I confess to being very rusty indeed on my basic constitutional and administrative law, including parliamentary procedure, so I remain completely in the dark so far as the current legal status of this Commencement Order is concerned, especially during the hiatus between the dissolution of one parliament and the summoning of the next.

Just to recap on the existing legislation, section 25 of the Greater London (General Powers) Act 1973 (as amended) provides that for the purposes of section [55(1) of the 1990 Act], the use as temporary sleeping accommodation of any residential premises in Greater London involves a material change of use of the premises and of each part thereof which is so used. “ Use as temporary sleeping accommodation” in this context means use as sleeping accommodation which is occupied by the same person for less than 90 consecutive nights [originally 22 nights] and which is provided (with or without other services) for a consideration arising either by way of trade for money or money's worth; or by reason of the employment of the occupant; whether or not the relationship of landlord and tenant is thereby created.

What section 44 will do (when it comes into effect on 26 May) is to make section 25 of the 1973 Act subject to a new section 25A. This provides that, notwithstanding the provisions of section 25(1), the use as temporary sleeping accommodation (i.e. for less than 90 days) of any residential premises in Greater London does not involve a material change of use if two conditions are met.

These are, first, that the sum of the number of nights of use as temporary sleeping accommodation, and the number of nights (if any) of each previous use of the premises as temporary sleeping accommodation in the same calendar year, does not exceed 90 and, secondly, that, in respect of each night which falls to be counted in this way, the person who provided the sleeping accommodation for the night (i.e. the owner or normal occupier) was liable to pay council tax in respect of the premises. If more than one person provided the sleeping accommodation for the night, then it’s OK if at least one of those persons was liable to pay council tax in respect of the premises. And it does not matter whether any previous use was by the same person. (I confess that I am not quite sure what difference dection 25A makes, compared with section 25 itself.)

The second new section (25B) gives either the local planning authority or the Secretary of State the power to direct that section 25A is not to apply to specified residential premises, or to residential premises situated in a particular area. A direction under this section can be given only if the local planning authority or the Secretary of State considers that it is necessary to protect the amenity of the locality. The local planning authority may give a direction under this section only with the consent of the Secretary of State. A direction under this section can be revoked at any time, but only by the person (i.e. the LPA or the S of S) who gave it. A direction is not subordinate legislation, and is not therefore subject to the usual legislative formalities, but this power will not arise before 26 May.

The Secretary of State may delegate his functions under this section to an LPA, or may direct that an LPA may give directions under this section without his consent (although he can also revoke such a delegation or direction).

The Secretary of State also has power by means of a statutory instrument to make regulations providing for the procedure which must be followed in connection with the giving of a direction under this section or in connection with its revocation, and as to the information which must be provided where the LPA seeks the consent of the Secretary of State to their giving a direction under this section.

Section 45 of the Deregulation Act then goes on to give the Secretary of State the power, by means of a statutory instrument, to make regulations to disapply section 25(1) of the 1973 Act if conditions specified by those regulations are met. The regulations must include provisions corresponding to section 25B but, subject to that, they may amend the 1973 Act, and may make different provisions for different purposes, and they may include incidental, supplementary, consequential, transitional, transitory or saving provisions. A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before, and approved by a resolution of, each House of Parliament.

It was section 45 of the 2015 Act I had in mind in pointing out that the Secretary of State would run out of time (and has now run out of time) in which to make any such regulations before the General Election. I didn’t follow the Deregulation Bill in its passage through parliament, other than to note its general progress, but I am under the impression that sections 44 and 45 as they have emerged in the Act differ somewhat from the original draft of the Bill, and that the amendments made during the passage of the Bill may well have been intended to overcome this time problem by allowing changes to the rules in advance of any statutory instrument being made.

If so, then it seems that Uncle Eric has ultimately been frustrated, and the intended relaxation of the rules on short-term lets in Greater London will have to await the pleasure of the next Secretary of State.

©MARTIN H GOODALL

The new GPDO - Permitted Changes of Use under Part 3

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I thought it might be helpful to share with you a table that I have prepared for my forthcoming book on Permitted Changes of Use. This lists each of the classes of development permitted by Part 3 in the order in which they now appear in Part 3 of the Second Schedule. The 2015 Order comes into effect on 15 April.

Several of the new permitted development rights reflect the changes made to the Use Classes Order, whereby Betting Offices and Pay Day Loan Shops have been removed from Use Class A2, so that each of them is now a sui generis use. Others represent a significant expansion of the permitted development that is now allowed by the GPDO, including changes of use from A1 to A2, A1 to A3 and A2 to A3, among several others.

In the first column, an asterisk in front of the class letter indicates that a prior approval application is required.

The second column shows the corresponding class of development that was permitted by the 1995 Order, from which it will be seen that Part 3 has grown considerably. The classes shown in brackets - (A), (C) and (CA) - indicate that those classes of permitted development in the 1995 Order did not exactly correspond with the provisions in the 2015 Order.

This table is necessarily a very abbreviated summary of Part 3, and does not reflect the numerous exclusions, restrictions and conditions attaching to the various classes of permitted development. For example, it does not indicate that certain classes of permitted development apply only where there is a ground floor display window. The individual classes of development are fully explained in the text of the book, but I am afraid you will have to save up your pennies to buy it when it is published this summer, as I don’t propose to publish all the contents for free in this blog!

In the meantime, I hope you may find this table helpful.


© MARTIN H GOODALL

REAL Reform of the Planning System ?

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In an article which I posted here five years ago, on Tuesday 20 April 2010, I speculated, through the words of a supposed speech by a member of a newly elected ‘Conlaberal’ government, on changes that could (and perhaps should) be made to planning law and practice.

This was a couple of weeks before the last General Election, when it did not appear that any of the main political parties had in mind any proposals resembling those canvassed in the article. If Labour were-to be re-elected, it seemed that their planning policies would in effect be ‘more of the same’ as we had seen for the past 13 years. The Tories, on the other hand, had discovered the concept of ‘Localism’ and appeared to be about to enact a NIMBY’s Charter if they were returned to power.

The Tory-led coalition that came to power in May 2010 did indeed set out to put these NIMBYist ideas into practice, daft and impractical though they seemed to be. I commented at the time that political and economic reality would sooner or later force a change of direction, and so it proved. This was not due solely to the desire of the government to boost an obviously flagging economy, but was also driven by a fundamental tension within the Tory party itself, between the Tory backwoodsmen - MPs and their constituents in the more green and pleasant parts of the country who were committed NIMBYs and just wanted to make development go away – and, on the other hand, the ‘free marketers’, led by the Tory Chancellor, George Osborne, with the support of his friend and mentor, David Cameron, not to mention other senior members of the government who believed passionately in allowing the unrestrained operation of market forces. This faction within the government, which rapidly gained the upper hand, saw building and development as something to be encouraged for its own sake, as well as being a useful means of boosting the economy.

These competing views were not confined to the Tory party itself, but had been evident within government (that is to say, within the government machine) for some time before 2010. The Treasury, in particular, had been pushing the case for building and development even under the last Labour government, as evidenced by several reports and initiatives coming out of the Treasury at that time.

What is remarkable, looking back over the past five years, is the extent to which the various ideas I canvassed in that April 2010 article have been put into practice, without any hint prior to the 2010 General Election that any of these proposals were on the agenda.

The words I put in the mouth of my fictitious Minister, dealing with some of the main policy changes he was supposedly putting forward included this: “First, I intend to widen considerably the scope of Permitted Development under the General Permitted Development Order, especially for householder developments. ...........What I have in mind is a much more liberal regime for householder developments” and he went on to say that he proposed to take the same approach to other parts of the GPDO.

Our fictitious minster also proposed to amend the Use Classes Order so as to produce rather broader classes, especially for commercial uses in town centres. For example, he proposed an amalgamation of the Category ‘A’ Use Classes in a single class, so that there would no longer be any restriction in changes of use to and from retail, office and catering uses in town centres. To quote the supposed speech again: “We really must leave it up to the market to decide what uses will be commercially viable in particular locations. I do not accept that we have to intervene in a misguided effort to protect primary retail frontages from other town centre uses.

The minister then went on to say that he also intended to make a number of important changes to ministerial policy advice. These included subjects such as Housing, Green Belts and development in the countryside. There was a need, in particular, to encourage house-building.

He said this : “There will still be a need for a very large number of houses to be built in the private sector, and it is frankly unrealistic to expect that the numbers required can be built without resort to a significant number of ‘green field’ sites, especially in the south-east of England. All that has been achieved by restricting new build to ‘brown’ land is an overall reduction in house building, and the over-provision of small flats when there is an overwhelming need for family houses, with a decent amount of garden space where children can play. I shall use my powers to ensure that sufficient housing land is released to provide the homes we need, and I shall reinforce ministerial policy requiring local planning authorities to identify a 5-year land supply for housing (with a 2-year supply of sites ready for immediate development), failing which undesignated ‘wind-fall’ sites will have to be given planning permission (on appeal, if necessary) in order to ensure that house-building targets are met.

Later in the speech, our putative minister turned the subject of Listed Buildings. He canvassed some changes to the system of listed building control, and said: “ We all greatly value our architectural heritage, but it is important that the owners and users of buildings protected by these formal designations should not be unduly fettered in their use of their property. A fair balance must be struck between preservation on the one hand and, on the other, appropriate change to ensure the continued beneficial use of such buildings.

He added: “In order to assist owners of listed buildings to determine whether listed building consent may or may not be required in particular circumstances, I propose to introduce provisions similar to the existing procedures for lawful development certificates. The non-availability of such certificates in respect of works to listed buildings is an anomaly that has long been in need of reform.

There were admittedly some rather more radical proposals in this speech that were never likely to see the light of day. These included a down-grading of the status of the Development Plan, by repealing section 38(6) of the 2004 Act, and considerably simplifying the plan-making process. A major review of Green Belt boundaries and of Green Belt policy as also proposed – but it is very unlikely that any political party will dare to grasp this particular nettle.

De-listing of large numbers of Grade II listed buildings was also suggested, coupled with a significant relaxation of listed building control with regard to internal alterations of Grade II buildings.

Finally, the minister proposed to embark on a thorough re-drafting of both primary and subordinate planning legislation, so as to iron out anomalies and ambiguities and generally to simplify what has become a grossly over-complicated system. He could well have added that there is an urgent need to streamline the development management process, so as to simplify planning applications and their processing.

So there is still much to do to bring about REAL reform of the planning system. I wonder whether the next government, whatever its political complexion, might be persuaded to tackle these issues.

© MARTIN H GOODALL

What’ll the Romans ever do for us?

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I had intended to write a piece under this title, reviewing the proposals in the various party manifestos that are relevant to town and country planning, but they are all so vague that it is pointless to waste time on them. There are various proposals for more house-building, including the possibility of ‘garden cities’, plus further encouragement to develop brownfield sites, but on the past performance of all three main parties over the past 20 years one has to treat these proposals with a considerable degree of scepticism, especially as none of the parties seems to have any idea of how they are going to deliver these extra houses in practice, having conspicuously failed to do so in the past.

Proposals relating specifically to planning reform are rather thin on the ground, and we may be in for a rather quieter time in that regard compared with the stream of significant changes made by the coalition government in recent years. But if the civil servants in De-CLoG are not going to be kept busy with preparing new legislation, they may turn their minds to a consolidation of the primary planning legislation. This was last consolidated in 1990, and so we are perhaps overdue for a further consolidating Act. I won’t personally welcome this, as it would mean that we would have to re-learn all the section numbers with which we have become so familiar over the past 25 years, but I would have to agree that it would make administrative sense.

The final factor which dissuaded me from writing a review of the election manifesto proposals is the extreme uncertainty as to the outcome of the election. I have a strong feeling that all the party manifestos will be just so much waste paper on May 8, and quite a few of the bright ideas put forward by various parties will have to be jettisoned in the course of the intense negotiations that are likely to follow an inconclusive election result.

Incidentally, it has become increasingly obvious that journalists commenting on the likely scenario after 7 May are pretty clueless as the constitutional law and practice that will govern the course of events in the aftermath of the election. The first thing to bear in mind is that all the members of the present coalition government are still in post, and this will remain the position on the morning of 8 May (even if some of those ministers no longer have parliamentary seats). I dare say ministers are not spending much time at their desks right now, being too busy campaigning around the country, but they will still be receiving their red boxes, and the business of government is still being carried on.

There is no rule or constitutional convention that requires a Prime Minister to ‘concede defeat’ and resign after losing an election. If the outcome of the election does not give any single party a Commons majority, it is in fact more sensible for the PM (and the rest of his government) to remain in post until it becomes clear whether a new administration can be formed, led by one party or another. Each of the two main party leaders (Cameron and Miliband) will no doubt urgently explore the possibilities in talks with other parties, and if Cameron, as the incumbent PM, thinks he can carry on, then he is free to meet the new House of Commons and to put forward his programme, and see whether the Commons will support him or not.

One thing that has become clear is that in these circumstances, when it is likely to remain very unclear as to which party could in fact form a viable government, the Queen has no intention of becoming embroiled in what is likely to be a messy political situation. HM is therefore unlikely to open the new parliament in person – it can be done by a commission, in the same way as Royal Assent to Bills and the Prorogation of Parliament. There would be no Queen’s Speech, and Cameron (if he decides to adopt this course of action) would simply have to set out his programme in the Commons. Sooner or later, he would be obliged to table a motion of confidence, and if the government loses that vote, the provisions of the Fixed Parliaments Act will kick in.

On the other hand, it may become clear on 8 May that the game is up for the Tories, and that Cameron stands no chance of commanding any sort of Commons majority, no matter what way the cards are cut. In that case (while Cameron remains in post at least as a caretaker) it will be up to Miliband to see if he can come to some arrangement with other parties (however informal it may be) which would allow a Labour or Labour-led government to function with the support of a majority of MPs in the Commons. If or when he signals that he has reached a position where he believes this is possible, Cameron would then resign, and Miliband would be invited by HM to form a government. I don’t propose to speculate as to how that government might be composed and, in particular, whether any members of one or more other parties might or might not be invited to join it. In any event, the viability of this government would probably have to be tested, sooner or later, by a confidence vote in the Commons, and if it is lost then (as I mentioned earlier) the provisions of the Fixed Parliaments Act would come into play.

There has been some wild talk in recent days about the ‘legitimacy’ of a government formed by a party which does not have the largest number of MPs in the Commons, but this is complete nonsense. It has always been the position that any party leader who appears to be in a position to command a Commons majority (whatever its make-up) may be called upon to form a government. Loose talk about whether a government does or does not have a ‘mandate’ is also just hot air. All that matters is that the government, whatever its political composition, and whatever the composition of its various supporters in the Commons, is able to carry on the government of the country with the support of the House. Teresa May’s assertion that such a scenario would be the worst constitutional crisis since the Abdication has been greeted with the derision that it deserved.

To be coldly objective, it seems extremely unlikely that David Cameron will be able to cobble together a Commons majority after May 7, whereas it appears that there could quite possibly be a comfortable Centre-Left majority for a government led by Ed Miliband, always provided that some of the perhaps rather rash statements made by him, by Nick Clegg and by the Scottish Nationalists as to whether or not they would be prepared to reach some sort of understanding with various other parties can be put aside, and that they can find a way of co-operating with each other to carry on the government of the country.

© MARTIN H GOODALL

Goodbye, Uncle Eric!

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The government has announced that Greg Clark [WHO???] has been appointed Secretary of State for Communities & Local Government in place of Eric Pickles. At the time of writing, I am not aware as to what role, if any, Eric Pickles may play in the government in the future. This may emerge in the course of the next few days. Maybe he will be put out to grass, although elevation to the House of Lords might not be an option if the PM wants to avoid a by-election in an Essex constituency where UKIP could no doubt be expected to mount a strong challenge.

Pickles has been possibly the longest serving head of this department and, in his rather plodding way, he has faithfully stuck to his brief, starting after the last election with the Localism Bill, which sought to put into effect the half-baked ideas that the Tories had dreamt up in opposition as a sop to the NIMBYs. However, the Wicked Uncle who resided (and still resides) at 11, Downing Street strangled the infant at birth, and Uncle Eric was then obliged to publish the National Planning Policy Framework, for which he clearly had no real enthusiasm, but he did what he was told, and it was eventually published in March 2012, encouraging much more development than the NIMBYs would have liked, or had been led to expect when the coalition government first took office.

Responding again to the diktats of the Treasury, Uncle Eric’s department then set about the further liberalisation of the planning regime, by amending the GPDO in three tranches (in May 2013, April 2014 and April 2015) to allow residential conversions of a variety of commercial premises and of farm buildings, as well as other changes of use that would otherwise have required planning permission. This met with strenuous opposition from some local planning authorities, but was forced through anyway, and has been backed up by some robust appeal decisions, which have swept aside objections to these developments. Recent amendment of the Use Classes Order has further liberalised the uses to which commercial premises can be put in future.

I will take a look at the new De-CLoG ministerial team in a future post. As I indicated before the election, the pace of change in planning law and practice may slow down somewhat now, especially since the government’s primary focus for the time being will be on other areas. However, there are some controversial infrastructure projects in the pipeline, including HS2 and the demand for additional airport capacity in the South-east (either at Heathrow or at Gatwick). There will no doubt be some unhappiness on the Tory back-benches if the government continues to push ahead with these schemes.

© MARTIN H GOODALL

GPDO 2015 - a problem?

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Like most planning professionals, I imagine, I have had my nose buried in the new GPDO since it was published, in an effort to check all the changes (some of them quite subtle) that have been made to this legislation by the new Order. (This, incidentally, explains the relative paucity of posts on this blog in the past few weeks.)

As a result of a question someone asked me (and which I still haven’t answered), I have hit upon a possible problem of statutory interpretation arising from the new GPDO.

Article 8 of the GPDO 2015 revokes all the statutory instruments listed in Schedule 4, including the 1995 Order, and the amendment orders of 2013, 2014 and the most recent amending order of March 2015. One would naturally expect, however, to find a savings provision in the new Order, and Article 8 does indeed contain such a provision. However, the saving in Article 8(2) is solely for the purposes of development specified in Article 6(2) of the March 2015 amendment order, namely in respect only of a temporary change of use, under Class C or Class D of Part 4, of premises used within Use Class A4 (drinking establishments), and certain demolition under what had been Part 31 in the 1995 Order (now replaced by Part 11 in the 2015 Order). There is nothing else to preserve the effect of any of the provisions of the 1995 Order.

Have I missed some obvious general rule, contained elsewhere in the planning legislation? Or is there some other general rule of statutory interpretation which would preserve the effect of repealed legislation in any way? If not, then it seems to me that the repeal of the 1995 Order and all its amending orders could have two consequences, one which would clearly disadvantage developers and one which could be of benefit to them.

It seems to me that (at least in theory) unless development has actually begun, any planning permission granted by Article 3 of the 1995 Order was revoked with effect from 15 April 2015, even if prior approval had been granted in respect of that development before that date. (Bear in mind that the prior approval is not a planning permission, and does not have the effect of a planning permission; it simply fulfils a condition without which the development could not proceed. The planning permission was actually granted by Article 3.) So does anyone who had intended to carry out development under the 1995 GPDO now have to start again, even if the LPA had notified the developer of their prior approval? If one views each of the 1995 Order (now repealed) and the 2015 Order (effective from 15 April) as being entirely self-contained and mutually exclusive, which in the absence of any relevant saving provision in the 2015 Order would appear to be the case, then this would appear to be the position (as I say, at least in theory) in which a developer could find themselves.

On the other hand, if we take (say) the 3-dwelling limit in the former Class MB and the same limit in the new Class Q (or the floorspace limit under each of those provisions), then arguably any development carried out under Class MB (i.e. commenced before 15 April 2015, even if it has not yet been completed) would not count towards the limits now imposed by Class Q. There is no mention anywhere in the new GPDO, as far as I know (and I really have been through it over and over again with a fine-tooth comb while writing my book on the subject) of development previously carried out under Class MB in the 1995 Order. So, arguably, one could have used up the 3-dwelling limit under Class MB (or the floorspace limit under that class) and still be able to develop another three dwellings under Class Q ! [I appreciate that the ability of the LPA to refuse prior approval because “the location or siting of the building makes it otherwise impractical or undesirable” for the proposed residential conversion might possibly be used as an excuse by an LPA, or even by PINS, to block extra dwellings over and above the three already built under former Class MB, but it is the underlying principle with which I am currently concerned.]

I put these points to my colleagues in Keystone Law’s planning law team, and we all agreed that the apparent result of this legislative change which I have postulated above cannot have been intended by ministers. So far as concerns the apparent revocation of any permission granted by the 1995 Order (even where prior approval has been given in respect of the relevant issues with which it was concerned), the consensus we have reached in the team is that the new GPDO must be construed in accordance with Human Rights legislation, in a way which is compatible with the landowner's rights under Article 1 of the First Protocol, so far as it is possible to do so, and that the permission granted by Article 3 of the 1995 GPDO should not be regarded as having been revoked where prior approval in respect of such a development has been given, bearing in mind the 3-year time limit for commencement under the 1995 Order. We have collectively taken the view that a commonsense approach is required to this issue. Nonetheless, the strict legal position remains uncertain.

We have similarly taken the view that a prior approval application made under the terms of the 1995 Order which has not yet been determined should be treated as an application under the corresponding provision in the 2015 Order and should be processed and determined in accordance with the new rules, with the 56-day rule continuing to run from the day after receipt of the prior approval application by the LPA. This again, however, is a matter of common sense rather than legal interpretation. Planning inspectors in determining planning appeals have certainly taken this approach in recent weeks.

However, as regards the limits on development that were imposed (for example) by Class MB in the 1995 Order, as compared with the same limits imposed by Class Q in the 2015 Order, we take a different view. We have come to the conclusion that it would theoretically be possible to create up to six dwellings within a single agricultural unit – three under Part 3, Class MB in the Second Schedule to the 1995 Order, and another three under Part 3, Class Q in the Second Schedule to the 2015 Order (subject to prior approval under the terms of Class Q). [If my my supposition as to the loss of these permitted development rights if they had not been implemented before the 1995 Order was repealed is in fact correct, these residential conversions would have to have been started before 15 April 2015 in accordance with a prior approval or approvals under Class MB.]

Incidentally, I trust that readers have caught up with the change made in the amending Order made shortly before the consolidating Order itself, which resolved the previous doubt as to whether the 3-dwelling limit applied to all dwellings previously created on the same agricultural unit or only those created as permitted development under the GPDO. That amendment, now carried into the substantive Order, confirmed that it is only dwellings created as permitted development under Class MB of the 1995 Order (and now under Class Q of the 2015 Order) that count towards the 3-dwelling limit.

I would be very grateful if readers could direct my attention to any legislative or judicial authority on the issues I have raised above, and I shall be pleased to publish these as comments on this post.

Meanwhile the text of my book (working title – “A Practical Guide to Permitted Changes of Use”) has now been completed, and we are now moving on to the editing stage and preparation for publication. It is still too early to give details of the book’s publication, and in particular the date when it is likely to become available, but I naturally hope it will be as soon as possible.

© MARTIN H GOODALL

Savings for old provisions in the GPDO

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When I wrote the other day about Article 8 of the GPDO 2015, I mentioned the possibility that there may be some general rule of statutory interpretation which would preserve the effect of the repealed legislation, but I had not had time to look this up.

I am grateful to Fraser Kerr for reminding me of section 16 of the Interpretation Act 1978. Although we are dealing here with a statutory instrument rather than an Act of Parliament, under section 23 (1) the provisions of this Act apply (unless the contrary intention appears) to subordinate legislation made after the commencement of this Act as they apply to Acts of Parliament. Section 16(1) provides that where an Act repeals an enactment, the repeal does not (unless the contrary appears) affect the previous operation of the enactments repealed or anything done or suffered under that enactment.

This is enough, I think, to protect the effect of a prior approval already granted before 15 April 2015, and this provision should also suffice to enable any pending prior approval applications and/or appeals against their refusal to be determined after 15 April, whereupon any prior approval so granted could be acted upon, even though the prior approval application was made under the provisions of the 1995 Order. It would also appear that the relevant provisions (including any limitations, conditions or restrictions) applying to the permitted development in question would be those under the 1995 Order, rather than the 2015 Order, although I am not absolutely certain about this last point.

In other cases, where no prior approval application had been made before 15 April, or in any cases where no prior approval was required (and where development had not commended before 15 April), the permitted development will now be entirely governed by the provisions of the 2015 Order.

So far so good, but I don’t think this answers the second problem which I posed in my last post, namely whether dwelling units (or floorspace) converted under a relevant class in the 1995 Order (e.g. under Class MB) should be counted towards the numerical limit (or cumulative floorspace limit) in the corresponding Class in the 2015 Order (Class Q in the example given). I am not convinced that the Interpretation Act has that effect. In this connection, I also looked at section 18 of the Interpretation Act, but I am not convinced that this section has the effect of enabling the provisions of the former classes of development in Part 3 of the 1995 Order to be read as if they were equally applicable to the corresponding new Classes in Part 3 of the 2015 Order. But I am open to persuasion on this point.

This last issue is perhaps more important, from a practical point of view, than the first point I raised. I am assuming for the time being that I am right in thinking that the numerical and floorspace limits in respect of development carried out under the 1995 Order do not affect development subsequently carried out under the corresponding provisions of the 2015 Order, but (as before) I would welcome any comments from readers on this point.

[P.S. I wrote this piece before I had seen Tom Bright’s comment, which has now been published under the previous post. I will take a look at the other point he raises, regarding Article 4 Directions, and come back on this subject in a future post.]

© MARTIN H GOODALL

The 56-day Rule - Some further thoughts

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Since I wrote my previous posts on this topic on 9 and 13 February and 11 March, I have taken the opportunity to look in more detail at the requirement as to the timing of the LPA’s notification of their determination of a prior approval application.

On the basis of the practical examples that I quoted in those posts, the consensus would appear to be that notification of the LPA’s determination of the prior application must not only be given by the authority within the 56-day period, but must also be received by the applicant within that period, and a proper construction of paragraph W(11), read as a whole, would seem to support this.

In paragraph W(11) of Part 3, sub-paragraph (a) refers to “the receipt by the applicant from the local planning authority of a written notice of their determination that such prior approval is not required” and sub-paragraph (b) refers to “the receipt by the applicant from the local planning authority of a written notice giving their prior approval”, although sub-paragraph (c) merely refers to “the expiry of 56 days following the date on which the application was received by the local planning authority without the authority notifying the applicant as to whether prior approval is given or refused”.

Sub-paragraph (c) relates to both of these two alternative notifications under sub-paragraph (a) or (b), and (by implication) to the third possibility that the notice served by the authority may be to inform the applicant that prior approval is refused. It therefore seems clear from the context that sub-paragraph (c) must also be taken to refer to the receipt by the applicant of such a notice, so sub-paragraph (c) should in practice be read as - “the expiry of 56 days following the date on which the application was received by the local planning authority without the receipt by the applicant from the local planning authority of a written notice as to whether prior approval is given or refused”.

Whilst on this topic, I am grateful to a correspondent for drawing to my attention the position regarding an appeal under section 78 against non-determination of a prior approval application, where the failure of the LPA to determine the application or to notify the applicant of that determination within the 56-day period is the sole determining factor in the appeal.

In such a case, the Planning Inspectorate seems recently to have taken the view that no appeal is required (or can be made) in such a case. I have been shown a letter from the Planning Inspectorate, written in May of this year in response to an appeal which had been made against non-determination of a prior approval application in Gloucestershire, in which they stated that, because it would appear that the LPA did not determine the application within the required 56 day period, the applicant can proceed with the development in these circumstances, and no right of appeal applies. The LPA had the power to refuse the application on the basis that the development was not appropriate for the prior approval process but there was no indication in this case that they did so. In the circumstances, the Inspectorate stated that the appeal appeared to be invalid and no further action would be taken on it. A copy of this letter was sent to the LPA who were asked to note its contents.

This would appear to dispose of the need to appeal against non-determination. If the applicant is correct in their assertion that they have the right to carry out the permitted development, then the expiry of the 56-day period would in principle enable the development to proceed, but if there is any doubt in such a case as to the qualification of the pre-existing use under the terms of the relevant Class of permitted development in Part 3, or as to the nature and scope of the proposed development itself, or if there is a dispute with the LPA as to the qualification of the site for change of use under the relevant Class in Part 3 (or where the LPA is otherwise challenging the right to carry out the proposed development), caution may suggest that the correctness of the applicant’s assertion as to the lawfulness of the proposed development should be tested by means of an application under section 192, before going ahead with the development.

It may be helpful to readers who are making an LDC application to be reminded of the judgment in F W Gabbitas v SSE and Newham LBC [1985] JPL 630, where it was held that the applicant's own evidence does not need to be corroborated by "independent" evidence in order to be accepted. If the local planning authority has no evidence of its own, or from others, to contradict or otherwise make the applicant's version of events less than probable, there is no good reason to refuse the application, provided the applicant's evidence alone is sufficiently precise and unambiguous to justify the grant of a certificate "on the balance of probability”. This was helpfully summarised in paragraph 8.15 of Annex 8 to Circular 10/97. The Circular was cancelled in March 2014, but the legal principles that it set out continue to apply.

© MARTIN H GOODALL


The 56-day rule – some additional points

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A couple of readers have written to me to draw attention to Article 7 of the GPDO. This is a new provision that did not appear in the 1995 Order.

There was no provision in the 1995 Order for any extension of time in respect of the determination of a prior approval application. However, Article 7 (after restating the basic rule that prior approval applications must be determined within 56 days) now allows the LPA to make a decision in relation to the application within such longer period as may be agreed by the applicant and the authority in writing (which could comprise an exchange of emails).

There is, of course, no obligation on the applicant to agree to such an extension of time, but if they do not do so a prudent authority might then refuse the application fairly promptly in order to avoid the 56-day rule coming into operation, thereby enabling the development to go ahead in any event. It is clear that any agreement to an extension of time would have to be explicit and unequivocal; it cannot be assumed or implied, nor can it be construed from only one side of a purported exchange of correspondence. A nil response from the applicant to the LPA’s a request for more time would not prevent time from continuing to run for the purposes of the 56-day rule. There would need to be some written evidence that both parties had agreed to extend time.

One correspondent queried whether sub-paragraphs (a), (b) and (c) in Article 7 do in fact enable time to be extended (or whether sub-paragraph (a) in fact rules this out), but there is no doubt that any one of sub-paragraphs (a) or (b) or (c) may apply; there is a comma after sub-paragraph (a), so it is clear that each is an alternative to the others.

Reverting to appeals against non-determination of a prior approval application, after further representations from the LPA, the Planning Inspectorate subsequently changed their minds in the case I mentioned in my last post, and accepted the appeal, on the basis that the case raised other issues besides the question of non-determination within the 56-day period. In the absence of such additional issues, though, it would appear that it is unnecessary (and in fact impossible) to appeal against the non-determination of a prior approval application. The right to proceed with the development arises automatically. However, if there is any doubt in such a case as to the qualification of the pre-existing use under the terms of the relevant Class of permitted development in Part 3, or as to the nature and scope of the proposed development itself, it may in such circumstances be advisable to make an application for a Lawful Development Certificate under section 192 of the 1990 Act, as I mentioned previously.

© MARTIN H GOODALL

ANDREW HIGNETT JOINS KEYSTONE LAW

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Although (as I have explained before) this blog is not intended to be a corporate or personal marketing tool, I am very pleased to be able to tell you that another leading planning and environment lawyer, Andrew Hignett, has joined KEYSTONE LAW. This further strengthens our well-established planning law team, and now gives us coverage of major infrastructure projects, particularly in the ports sector, in addition to the other specialisations we already cover. It brings the number of planning lawyers in the firm to five, all of whom have substantial experience in planning law at a senior level.

Andrew’s key skills are founded in planning and environmental law, and he principally advises ports and other organisations in the sector on marine-related development, particularly in relation to port infrastructure projects. As well as project work, Andrew advises on regulatory and harbour management issues, including the promotion of Harbour Revision Orders.

He has considerable practical experience on the impact of nature conservation law in both the UK and Europe. Andrew also has experience of the judicial review of development consents, including planning permissions, marine licences, and harbour revision orders.

Andrew is a member of the UK Environmental Law Association and is actively involved in the work of the British Ports Association. He also writes and lectures on issues of concern to the ports industry.

© MARTIN H GOODALL

Catching up

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Readers will have noticed that three weeks have passed since I last posted anything here, when I reported the arrival of Andrew Hignett as a member of our Planning Law Team; and the last substantive post on a planning issue was three weeks before that. Three of those weeks were taken up with final completion of my forthcoming book (“A Practical Guide to Permitted Changes of Use”) of which I hope to post further details shortly. The remaining time was accounted for by a much needed holiday.

It seems to be an immutable Law of Nature that whenever I go away for more than a week or so, the government seizes the opportunity to rush out major announcements of forthcoming changes to planning law and procedure, and so it proved this time. I will comment on the government’s proposals in due course, although what has been announced so far is a bit light on detail.

Not yet formally announced, but widely anticipated, is the further amendment of the GPDO so as to make permanent the PD right for the residential conversion of offices under Part 3, Class O of the Second Schedule to the GPDO, which is currently due to expire towards the end of May next year. These further changes should occasion no surprise, as they were canvassed in some detail in last year’s consultation paper. It is only their timing that has remained in doubt, and my guess is that an amendment Order will be made so as to come into force at the beginning of October.

Those who followed my various posts on short term lets in Greater London will be aware by now that, following the re-election of a Conservative government, sections 44 and 45 of the Deregulation Act 2015 duly took effect on 26 May so as to allow the short-term letting of dwellings in Greater London, which had previously been restricted by the Greater London Council (General Powers) Act 1973. There had been a possibility that a different election result might have led to the new provisions not taking effect, but now that we are living in a Tory paradise nothing can stop the government doing exactly what they like.

There are various other matters, including some judicial decisions, that may merit comment as soon as I have the chance to write them up, and I rather hope that I can now update this Blog more frequently than I have managed to do in the past couple of months. The same applies to the rather large backlog of comments that are awaiting moderation and publication.

© MARTIN H GOODALL

How to ‘fix’ the planning system

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Earlier this month there was a flurry of announcements intended to make it look as if the government is at last prepared to do something about the continuing failure (primarily on the part of the development industry, but they of course are excused from any blame by the government) to deliver sufficient new housing to meet ever-growing demand. This process started with a joint newspaper article by Cameron and Osborne in The Times on 4 July, foreshadowing the budget statement and various press releases and other documents issued to coincide with the budget the on 8 July, and then on 10 July a policy document described as the government’s “Productivity Plan” and entitled Fixing the Foundations.

I have commented before on the Treasury’s habit of taking ownership of such announcements, rather than De-CLoG, leaving that subservient department to obey the commandments of the Chancellor handed down on tablets of stone from the Mount Sinai of Downing Street. This is nothing new; the tendency of the Treasury to take charge was equally evident under the last Labour government. But Gorgeous George has always found this approach particularly to his taste, and he has been in a notably gung-ho (not to say hubristic) mood since the election.

The government’s proposals for further changes to the planning system are set out in Chapter 9. With regard to housebuilding, the document acknowledges the longstanding failure to build enough homes to keep up with growing demand, and notes that housing starts fell by nearly two-thirds between 2007 and 2009, with the number of first time buyers falling by more than 50% between 2006 and 2008 (carefully selected figures to coincide with the last period of Labour government).

The document blames “an excessively strict planning system”, which prevents land and other resources from being used efficiently, thereby impeding productivity by increasing the cost and uncertainty of investment, hindering competition, constraining the agglomeration [?] of firms and the mobility of labour, and encouraging land speculation, rather than productive development. Ministers assert that the resulting under-supply of housing, especially in high-growth areas of the country, has pushed up house prices.

The document recognises that the glacial pace of the plan-making system has been a major constraint in achieving the release of housing land, although they refuse to acknowledge one of the primary factors in this – the abolition under Eric Pickles’ superintendency of the Regional Spatial Strategies, which were designed to ensure that all authorities should contribute their share to meeting housing land need. The weak and wishy-washy ‘duty to co-operate’ that was incorporated in the Localism Act failed (as nearly everyone predicted) to provide an effective alternative, and even the NPPF has only had a limited effect in securing the release of housing land.

The plain fact is that local planning authorities, with all the local political pressures to which they are subject, cannot be trusted to deliver the housing that is needed in their areas in order to meet demand not only locally but generated in neighbouring areas as well. The government forswears ‘top-down planning’, but is nevertheless obliged to cast about for some mechanism that would force the hands of LPAs.

In pursuit of this objective, the government has announced its intention to take further action to ensure that local authorities put local plans in place by a set deadline. That deadline has been announced today in a written ministerial statement. It will be “early 2017” (five years after the publication of the NPPF), although it is not entirely clear whether ‘producing’ a local plan means actually adopting it, or merely publishing the first consultation draft. Furthermore, a local plan is not complete until all the DPDs are in place (a lengthy process). I suspect that what is referred to here is simply the Core Strategy.

The government proposes to publish league tables, setting out local authorities’ progress on their Local Plan. The league tables will be fairly meaningless in themselves, but where it becomes clear that LPAs are not making effective progress towards the adoption of a Local Plan, De-CLoG will intervene in those authorities and will do the job themselves. Whether this will in practice lead to faster plan-making is perhaps open to doubt.

This will be accompanied by proposals to streamline the plan-making process significantly, helping to speed up the process of implementing or amending a plan. The government also intends to strengthen the duty of cooperation between local authorities (a clear admission that this provision in the 2011 Act has been ineffective). This means that LPAs will have to be prepared to find housing land to meet the housing needs of adjoining local authority areas where they cannot be met within those areas themselves. However, you can be sure that this will produce a good deal of screaming and kicking on the part of some local councillors, who can see no reason why Midsomer Fartworthy District Council should be forced to allow houses to be built on its nice green fields just to meet the housing needs of their despised neighbours in the Borough of Clagthorpe.

There is a suggestion that further use will be made of development corporations to deliver higher-density development in designated areas. The government says it will consider how policy can support higher density housing around key commuter hubs. There is also a welcome intention to devise policy guidance to secure the release of commercial and industrial land for housing. Local planning authorities are all too prone to resist the ‘loss’ of employment land on which future commercial or industrial development is very unlikely ever to take place, and for which there is no demand in practice.

There is a more radical proposal for ‘brownfield’ sites (previously developed land), where the government is promising “an urban planning revolution”, including funding to provide infrastructure, strong local leadership to shape development and assemble sites, and the removal of unnecessary planning obstacles. The real problem, as anyone who has been involved with such sites is well aware, is the cost of remediation of site contamination where there has been an interesting and varied history of industrial uses. Developers have been known to bankrupt themselves in the process of trying to clean up sites of this sort.

Ministers contend that the planning system can create the sort of “slow, expensive and uncertain process” that reduces the appetite to build, where development proposals require individual planning permission and are subject to detailed and discretionary scrutiny. The government says it is clear on the need to promote the use of brownfield land, and that it will remove all unnecessary obstacles to its re-development, including these sorts of planning obstacles. To this end, as well as legislating for statutory registers of brownfield land suitable for housing, the government proposes to legislate to grant automatic permission in principle on brownfield sites identified on those registers, subject to the approval of a limited number of technical details. On brownfield sites, this will give England a ‘zonal’ system, like those seen in many other countries, reducing unnecessary delay and uncertainty for brownfield development. (Hands up those of you who are old enough to remember ‘zoning’ in this country, and its abolition under ‘new-style’ development plans in the 1980s.) There is also a suggestion that compulsory purchase powers may be used to assemble housing sites on brownfield land.

The assertion is repeated that delays in processing planning applications may be a significant factor preventing housing supply from responding to upturns in the market. So the government proposes to legislate to allow major infrastructure projects with an element of housing to apply through the Nationally Significant Infrastructure Regime (i.e. taking the project out of the normal planning system and shoving it through the fast-track procedure for Development Consent).

There is a threat to further tighten the thumb-screws of the planning performance regime, so that local authorities making 50% or fewer of decisions on time are at risk of designation. The performance regime will also be extended to minor applications, so that local authorities processing those applications too slowly will be at risk of designation.

An unspecified fast-track certificate process is also proposed for establishing the principle of development for minor development proposals, coupled with an intention to significantly tighten the ‘planning guarantee’ for minor applications (whatever that means).

Section 106 agreements have also been identified as a delaying factor, and so the government proposes to introduce “a dispute resolution mechanism” [sic] for section 106 agreements, to speed up negotiations and allow housing starts to proceed more quickly. There isn’t supposed to be a ‘dispute’ about a draft section 106 agreement; it is intended to be negotiated, but where an LPA is proving difficult, I suppose some means of shifting the log-jam may be helpful (although an appeal against non-determination may still be the most practical way forward).

Finally, in order to bring forward more ‘starter’ homes, the government intends to extend the current exception site policy, and to strengthen the presumption in favour of Starter Home developments, starting with unviable or underused brownfield land for retail, leisure and institutional uses. These starter developments will be exempted from the Community Infrastructure Levy, and from the requirement to provide or contribute towards affordable housing. Tariff-style general infrastructure funds will not be sought from them.

How this will all be brought about will become clear over the next year or so. We will presumably see yet another Planning Bill later in this parliamentary session, and some re-writing of ministerial policy to give effect to the government’s stated intentions. How effective all this will prove to be is open to doubt, and I have already heard some very sceptical views expressed as to the actual delivery of all those new houses.

The government has still not addressed some of the real bugbears of the planning system, such as the nonsenses over the ‘validation’ of planning applications. Nor have they addressed the chronic under-funding of planning departments in local authorities and the consequent lack of sufficient experienced planning officers to handle planning applications quickly and effectively. If local authorities are squeezed even harder by the Treasury (as seems likely) things will only get worse. It is not enough for ministers to will the end; they must also will the means.

© MARTIN H GOODALL

Lack of EIA not fatal to planning permission

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There has been a trend in recent years for amenity groups and other third party objectors to challenge procedural irregularities in an effort to overturn planning decisions to which they were opposed. Where the challenge appears to have been of a pedantically ‘technical’ nature, the courts have not hesitated to dismiss such challenges, on the grounds that there was no substantive unfairness or no breach of procedure of sufficient significance as to amount to a legal error that would justify quashing the planning decision. In addition, there are occasionally cases where the legal objection is made out, but where it is still not appropriate, in the court’s view, that the planning decision should be quashed.

It is a well established principle that the courts have a discretion as to whether (and, if so, in what form) relief should be granted where a legal challenge to a planning decision, or other administrative decision or action, is made out. There are various factors that the court will take into account in deciding whether to grant relief in such cases, such as whether the decision under challenge has substantially prejudiced the claimant, and whether there is a realistic prospect that, upon the matter in question being redetermined by the desdion-maker, there is any realistic prospect that a different decision might be reached.

It was the latter point that led the Supreme Court, in R (Champion) v North Norfolk District Council and another [2015] UKSC 52 on 22 July 2015 to dismiss an appeal aimed at securing the quashing of a planning permission for the erection of two grain silos and the construction of a lorry park with wash bay and ancillary facilities, on a site close to the River Wensum. In this case, there was no disagreement that it was appropriate for the LPA to undertake a screening exercise in respect of the scheme proposed by the planning application, and that this exercise had been legally defective.

However, having found a legal defect in the procedure leading to the grant of planning permission, it was necessary for the court to consider the consequences in terms of any remedy. Following the decision of the Supreme Court in Walton v Scottish Ministers [2012] UKSC 44, [2013] PTSR 51, it is clear that, even where a breach of the EIA Regulations is established, the court retains a discretion to refuse relief if the applicant has been able in practice to enjoy the rights conferred by European legislation [by making representations and by having all the relevant issues fully considered by the decision-maker], and there has been no substantial prejudice.

The subsequent judgment of the Court of Justice of the European Union in Gemeinde Altrip v Land Rheinland-Pfalz (Case C-72/12) [2014] PTSR 311 confirmed that not every procedural defect will necessarily have consequences that can possibly affect the legality of a planning decision and it cannot, therefore, be considered to impair the rights of the party pleading it. This was consistent with the decision of the Supreme Court in Walton.

The court therefore dismissed the appeal. Although the proposal should have been subject to assessment under the EIA Regulations, that failure did not in the event prevent the fullest possible investigation of the proposal and the involvement of the public. There was no reason to think that a different process would have resulted in a different decision, and the claimant’s interests had not been prejudiced.

It should not be assumed from this judgment that an incorrect screening opinion and the consequent lack of an EIA can be lightly overlooked. Clearly there are many cases in which such a defect would be fatal to the grant of planning permission. The judgment does, however, make it clear that procedural error alone, even in relation to compliance with European Directives, will not automatically lead to a planning permission being quashed. The issue of prejudice (not merely to the challenging party, of course, but also to the wider interests that they are seeking to protect) will be a determining factor in the court’s decision as to whether or not they should exercise their discretion to quash the planning permission or to grant such other relief as the claimant may be seeking.

One other point to emerge from this judgment is that the court considering an application for permission to bring judicial review proceedings should take into account the likelihood of relief being granted, even if a legal error were to be clearly established. So permission to bring such cases in future may be refused at the outset if the view is taken that, upon a full hearing of the case, relief is unlikely to be granted. I foresee some difficulties arising from this suggestion, and it will be interesting to see how this point is dealt with if or when it arises in future permission applications under CPR Part 54.

© MARTIN H GOODALL

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